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Abstract 
This paper considers a model of international duopoly with global pollution to investigate the impact of tariff policy 
and licensing contracts on environmental technology transfer. Our main finding is that free trade is not always 
preferable. When the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) is within a certain range, there is a possibility that 
the total world welfare is higher under a positive tariff rate than under a zero tariff rate. This implies that the protection 
of IPR being beyond the range is a prerequisite for the justification of free trade. 
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     1 Introduction
Transfer of low-carbon and renewable technology to fast-growing economies is a key aspect
in addressing global climate change (IPCC 2007, 218-224). Developing countries often claim
that compulsory licensing, by which a government forces the holder of a patent to grant the
use of the technologies to the state or others, is eﬀective for the transfer of environmental
technologies. Industrialized countries, however, tend to prefer a free trade policy, where
technology is indirectly transferred through the trade of commodities that are produced
in their countries. From this standpoint, it is necessary to remove tariﬀs and other trade
barriers to decrease the price of environmental technology.
A World Bank (2008) summary of applied tariﬀs for solar photovoltaic technology in
18 high-GHG-emitting developing countries found that except in one case, import tariﬀs
range from 32 to 6 percent. These are much higher than the average tariﬀs in high-income
OECD countries (4%). Tariﬀ barriers on ﬂuorescent lamps in these 18 countries are also
high, varying from 30 to 5 percent, again with one exception. The tariﬀ on ﬂuorescent lamps
is the highest across all clean technologies assessed.
This paper considers an international duopoly model to investigate the impact of tariﬀ
policy and licensing contracts on environmental technology transfer. Our main ﬁnding is that
free trade is not always preferable to tariﬀs. When the protection of intellectual property
rights is within a certain range, there is a possibility that the total world welfare is higher
under a positive tariﬀ rate than under a zero tariﬀ rate.
Some previous studies have examined the relationship between trade policy and environ-
mental technology transfer (e.g., see Hattori, 2007; Itoh and Tawada, 2003; and Takarada,
2005). The previous studies assume that the technological transfer is free of charge, and fo-
cus mainly on transfer through public funding: on the other hand, this study considers two
channels for the transfer of technology of a private ﬁrm: international trade and licensing
contracts. 1 Qiu and Yu (2009) analyze the incentive of a developing country to participate
in an international environmental agreement through environmental technology transfer. Al-
though they consider environmental technology transfer between ﬁrms using licensing fee,
they do not consider the relation between the technology transfer and trade policy. We
incorporate royalty fees in our model and emphasize the interaction between the trading of
products and the licensing of technology through the setting of tariﬀs.
Many studies have investigated the interaction between environmental policy and trade
policy (e.g., see Lai and Hu, 2008; Ohori, 2006; Riveiro, 2008 for recent contributions).
Instead, this paper does not consider environmental policy instruments since it is assumed
to be sometimes diﬃcult to implement an environmental tax in the real world. The proposal
1Popp (2008) considers public funding and private ﬁrm behavior as sources of technological transfer. A
representative example of public funding is aid from governments or non-governmental organizations in the
form of oﬃcial developmental assistance. Private transfer of technology can take place in three ways: trade,
foreign direct investment, and license to a local ﬁrm.
1of a carbon tax, which gives ﬁrms disadvantage in the global market, typically faces the
strong refusal from industry groups even in developed countries. Thus, the tariﬀ in our
analysis plays two oﬀsetting roles: protecting the local ﬁrms and diﬀusing environmental
advanced technology.
Some studies have examined the role of trade policy as second-best policy instruments.
For example, Copeland (1996) considers the role of trade policy to control pollution generated
by a foreign ﬁrm. He shows that a tariﬀ on the foreign product operates to protect the
domestic ﬁrm in addition to restrict pollution. Assuming asymmetric information for the
cost of clean technology, Ludema and Takeno (2006) investigate the role of tariﬀ on the
incentive of a foreign ﬁrm to adopt clean technology. They show that a tariﬀ induces the
foreign ﬁrm to adopt clean technology under the complete information. However, these
literatures do not consider the role of tariﬀ to remedy pollution caused by the local ﬁrm.
Regibeau and Gallegos (2004) investigate the role of a tariﬀ to remedy a home ﬁrm’s
pollution activity. They consider how the tariﬀ makes an eﬀect on the incentive of the home
ﬁrm to adopt clean technology and show that the home ﬁrm adopts clean technology if tariﬀ
rate arise after adopting the technology. Although the mechanism of our model is similar to
theirs, our paper takes into account the cost of adopting a clean technology as endogenously
determined through licensing contract with the foreign ﬁrm. As a result, there is a case that
licensing contract does not occur in our model.
Although the basic structure of our model is similar to those of Kabiraj and Marjit
(2003) and Mukherjee and Pennings (2006), there are three important diﬀerences. First, we
consider global pollution while these studies do not. Accordingly, our analysis can address
the situation when technological transfer is potentially beneﬁcial for any country from the
environmental point of view. Second, our analysis incorporates intellectual property rights
(IPR) as a factor having signiﬁcant implications for technological transfer. One of our
ﬁndings suggests that the protection of IPR is a prerequisite for justifying free trade. Third,
in contrast to Kabiraj and Marjit (2003), our model does not assume that the diﬀerence in
production cost is a signiﬁcant incentive for technological transfer. This is done to conﬁne
the analysis to the diﬀerence in the environmental impacts of production technology.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We present an international duopoly
model with pollution in Section 2. In Section 3, we investigate the free trade policy and
compare it with a case where the local country determines the tariﬀ rate after the licensing
activity. The ﬁnal section provides our conclusions.
2 The model
We consider a model of duopoly with one foreign ﬁrm and one local ﬁrm. We represent the
foreign by subscript f and the local by l. We suppose that the product is homogeneous except
for its environmental properties. The product produced by the local ﬁrm generates global
external diseconomy. The foreign ﬁrm has clean technology; therefore, its product does not
adversely aﬀect the environment. The clean technology of the foreign ﬁrm is transferable. If
2the technology is transferred by a licensing agreement to the local ﬁrm, its product does not
cause environmental damage. We assume that the license fee is paid by royalties, although
a qualitatively similar result is obtained under the assumption of a ﬁxed fee.
The proﬁts of the foreign ﬁrm and the local ﬁrm are ¼
j;k







l = (p¡rj)ql, respectively, where j = fF;Tg represents the trade policy with F denoting
free trade and T denoting the tariﬀ policy, and k = fL;Ng represents the state of licensing
contract with L denoting licensing and N denoting no licensing. The parameter t denotes
the tariﬀ rate imposed on the product of the foreign ﬁrm and r > 0 is the royalty rate. Note
that when there is no licensing, r = 0. Further, in the case of free trade, t = 0. Following
Qiu and Yu (2009), we assume a linear inverse demand function p = ® ¡ qf ¡ ql, and
standardize the marginal private cost of producing the product to zero. 2 The social welfare





f ¡(°=2)ED.3 The social welfare of the local country is the sum of the consumer











f ¡ (°=2)ED. We assume that one unit of production
generates one unit of pollution. Environmental damage is represented as ED = (¯q
j;k
l )2 and
is common for both countries. 4 The evaluation of environmental damage is denoted by °=2.
5 Since licensing eliminates environmental damage, ED = 0 when there is licensing. The
exogenous parameter ¯ 2 (0;1] represents the degree of IPR protection. If ¯ 2 (0;1), IPR
protection is imperfect, which means that the local ﬁrm can freely copy the technology of
the foreign ﬁrm. We assume that it is impossible to imitate the technology perfectly and
remove the case where ¯ = 0.
3 Comparing free trade and tariﬀ policy
3.1 Free trade
We consider the case of free trade where the tariﬀ rate is ﬁxed at zero. A lower tariﬀ rate
can increase the export of products with low carbon emission from the developed country
to the developing country, which can help diﬀuse the environmental technology embodied in
it. The timing of this game is as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, the foreign ﬁrm oﬀers royalty r
2We assume that the marginal cost is the same for clean technology and dirty technology. This assumption
enables us to focus on the technology transfer motivated only by environmental impact. In contrast, Kabiraj
and Marjit (2003) analyzed the situation where the diﬀerence in marginal cost drives technology transfer.
3We omit the consumption in the foreign country for convenience. However, because the markets are
segmented between local and foreign, the result holds even if we include the foreign market.
4Since we consider global pollution including climate change resulting from the emission of carbon dioxide,
environmental damage is assumed to be the same for both the foreign country and the local country.
5The ° should be diﬀerent between the foreign and the local country depending on the situation and
characteristic of the environmental issue. For example, assuming higher gamma for the foreign country and
including the foreign environmental policy would allow us to address the issue of competitive environmental
policy between countries. However, under the present framework of analysis, we obtain qualitatively same
results even with diﬀerent gamma. We assume °f = °l = °=2 to simplify the analysis.
3to the local ﬁrm. In the second stage, the local ﬁrm decides whether or not to accept the
oﬀer. In the ﬁnal stage, the ﬁrms engage in quantity competition. The equilibrium concept
is subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). The game is solved backwards.
The second stage equilibrium quantity and proﬁt with and without licensing become
q
F;L
f = (® + r)=3, q
F;L






















l when r > 0, the local ﬁrm
has no incentive for accepting a licensing contract. Moreover, since the contract does not
change the proﬁt of the foreign ﬁrm, there is no licensing. The equilibrium in the free




l = ®2=9;SW F
f =
®2(2 ¡ ¯2°)=18;SW F
l = ®2(6 ¡ ¯2°)=18;SW F
w = ®2(4 ¡ ¯2°)=9:
Because the licensing of the environmental technology does not improve the competitive-
ness of the local ﬁrm, the local ﬁrm has no incentive for technological transfer via licensing.
As a result, there is no licensing agreement under the free trade regime.
3.2 Tariﬀ policy
In this section, we investigate the case where the tariﬀ rate is determined after the licensing
agreement. In the real world, as pointed out by Mukherjee and Pennings (2006) and Neary
and Leahy (2000), a government has the incentive to change the pre-announced tariﬀ rate.
Therefore, we analyze a no-commitment regime as probable tariﬀ policy. In the ﬁrst stage
of this game, the foreign ﬁrm oﬀers a licensing contract with royalty r to the local ﬁrm.
In the second stage, the local ﬁrm decides whether or not to accept the oﬀer. In the third
stage, the local government determines the tariﬀ rate t. In the ﬁnal stage, the ﬁrms engage
in quantity competition.
We obtain the third stage equilibrium quantity and the proﬁt under no license as q
T;N
f =
®(1 + ¯2°)=(9 + ¯2°) and q
T;N

















respectively. The third stage equilibrium quantity and tariﬀ rate under a licensing contract
are q
T;L
f = (® + 3r)=9 and q
T;L
l = 2(2® ¡ 3r)=9, and tL = ®=3, respectively. Moreover,
the proﬁts of the foreign ﬁrm and the local ﬁrm are ¼
T;L



















The ﬁrst term of equation (1) is the tariﬀ rate when there is no environmental damage.
The second term is the marginal environmental damage generated by increasing the tariﬀ
by one unit. Therefore, 4®¯2°=3(9 + ¯2°) = @[(°=2)ED]=@ql ¢ @ql=@t. In the absence
of an environmental policy, the local government considers the environmental impact in
determining the tariﬀ. Since the product of the local ﬁrm is associated with pollution
4and is not exposed to the tariﬀ, the local government sets a lower tariﬀ to diﬀuse the
environmentally friendly product of the foreign ﬁrm. Since there is no environmental damage,
on the other hand, the local country can raise the tariﬀ rate to protect its ﬁrm when licensing
occurs. In summary, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The optimal tariﬀ is higher with licensing than without licensing: tL > tN.
Moreover, with regard to the relation between the tariﬀ with licensing and that without
licensing, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The diﬀerence between the tariﬀ with licensing and that without licensing is
larger when ¯ or ° is larger: @[tL ¡ tN]=@¯ > 0 and @[tL ¡ tN]=@° > 0.
Because environmental damage is larger when ¯ and ° are larger, to suppress environ-
mental damage, the local government tends to diﬀuse the environmentally friendly product
produced by the foreign ﬁrm, which lowers tN.





l . We obtain the corner solution and derive the license fee r¤ = 2®¯2°=(27 +




l . Unlike in free trade, because tL > tN, the local ﬁrms has an
incentive to adopt the pollution-free technology; therefore, the license fee is positive.
Although the result of Proposition 1 is the same as that obtained in Regibeau and
Gallegos (2004), unlike their analysis, we take into account the cost of adopting a clean
technology as endogenously determined through licensing contract. In our model, especially,
foreign ﬁrm is reluctant to license the technology, because it faces a higher tariﬀ by licensing
its technology.
When the foreign ﬁrm licenses the technology, the quantity and proﬁt of the foreign
ﬁrm are q
T;L
f = ®(3 + ¯2°)=3(9 + ¯2°) and ¼
T;L
f = ®2 (9 + 30¯2° + ¯4°2)=9(9 + ¯2°)
2,




f . Rearranging this condition and solving for ¯
leads to the next proposition (see Appendices for the proofs of the propositions).
Proposition 2. Licensing occurs if and only if ¯ ·
p
3=2° when the foreign ﬁrm oﬀers r¤.
Since tL > tN, the foreign ﬁrm faces a higher tariﬀ by licensing its technology: this is the
cost of licensing the technology for the foreign ﬁrm. However, as pointed out by Mukherjee
and Pennings (2006), the foreign ﬁrm may oﬀset the negative eﬀect of higher tariﬀ by the
revenue from the license fee. When ° < 1:5, because
p
3=2° > 1 and ¯ 2 (0;1], the foreign
ﬁrm always licenses its technology to the local ﬁrm. Because, in this case, environmental
damage is small, tL ¡ tN is small and consequently the cost of licensing is small enough
for the foreign ﬁrm to license its technology. On the other hand, when ° > 1:5 and IPR
protection is perfect (¯ = 1), there is no licensing agreement. In this case, because the local
ﬁrm cannot imitate the technology and environmental damage is large, the local government
lowers the tariﬀ rate to diﬀuse the environmentally friendly product produced by the foreign
ﬁrm, which increases the licensing cost for the foreign ﬁrm. Moreover, when ° is large, the
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Figure 1: proposition 3




, that is, when there is no licensing, the local government
subsidizes the foreign ﬁrm, and therefore, tN < 0.
3.3 Comparison
We compare world welfare under free trade with that under tariﬀ policy.
Proposition 3. World welfare under tariﬀ policy is higher than (resp. lower than or equal











Figure 1 is the illustration of proposition 3. The vertical axis shows the IPR protection and
the horizontal axis shows the environmental damage. The shaded part is the area where
world welfare under tariﬀ policy is higher than that under free trade. When ¯ 2 (0;Á(°)],
environmental damage is small and is avoided through the imitation of the technology; thus,
the beneﬁt of a licensing contract is very small. Consequently, it is beneﬁcial for world welfare







there is licensing only in the tariﬀ policy. In this case, the beneﬁt of technology transfer is







, there is no licensing agreement under free trade and tariﬀ policy.
Because larger ¯ and ° and no licensing imply greater environmental damage, it is beneﬁcial
for world welfare to remove the cost of tariﬀ and diﬀuse the environmentally friendly product.
Further, there is no licensing when ¯ >
p
3=°. However, in this case, the local government
subsidizes the foreign ﬁrm, which in turn is beneﬁcial for the environment and the foreign
ﬁrm. Note that in principal, the foreign country does not prefer tariﬀ policy to free trade,
6even though the local country always prefers it. When there is licensing, if the beneﬁt from
the reduction in environmental damage is larger than the cost of tariﬀ, the foreign country
prefers tariﬀ policy to free trade. This tendency, therefore, increases when environmental




, because the foreign ﬁrm receives subsidy, the
foreign country prefers tariﬀ policy to free trade even though there is no licensing agreement.
Comparison of social welfare in each country leads to the following proposition.










both countries prefer tariﬀ
policy to free trade.
Because Ã(°) ¡ Á(°) ¼ 0:4102654=
p
° > 0, the range where tariﬀ policy is preferable to
free trade for both countries is smaller than that for world welfare.
Kabiraji and Marjit (2003) focus on the welfare of the local country and conclude that
the tariﬀ policy that induces the licensing contract is always preferable. This technology
transfer is induced by the diﬀerence in the marginal costs of production between the foreign
ﬁrm and the local ﬁrm. In contrast, our model assumes that the marginal cost is the same
and the environmental impact is diﬀerent across the two countries. Taking world welfare
into consideration, the results of our analysis show that there are regions where free trade is
preferable to tariﬀ policy. However, free trade is not always preferable. Since we have global
pollution and there does not exist an environmental policy instrument in the local country,
there exists a case where tariﬀ policy is preferable to free trade. Moreover, Proposition 4
shows that the tariﬀ policy can be Pareto improving to free trade in some cases.
4 Conclusion
This paper examined the welfare implications of the free trade regime and licensing agreement
within a framework of international duopoly with global pollution. We have shown that free
trade is not preferable if the protection of IPR is within a certain range. This implies that the
protection of IPR being beyond the range is a prerequisite for the justiﬁcation of free trade.
We have also revealed that the optimal tariﬀ is higher with licensing than without it. Since
there is no environmental damage under the licensing agreement, the local country can raise
the tariﬀ rate to protect its ﬁrm. In contrast, without licensing, the local government sets a
lower tariﬀ level and diﬀuse the product of the foreign ﬁrm. This is because the product of
the local ﬁrm is associated with pollution when there is no licensing contract.
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The equilibrium value under the case of no-commitment































































































®2 (65 ¡ 14¯2° + ¯4°2)
2(9 + ¯2°)
2 : (10)
The proof of Proposition 3
8We compare SW F
w with SW T












®2 (63 ¡ 132¯2° ¡ 33¯4°2 ¡ 2¯6°3)
18(9 + ¯2°)
2 : (11)
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w with SW T










®2 (3 ¡ ¯2°)(21 + ¯2°)(1 + 2¯2°)
18(9 + ¯2°)
2 : (12)
Solving (3 ¡ ¯2°) = 0 with respect to ¯ we obtain ¯ =
p
3=°. Therefore, SW F
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The proof of Proposition 4
First, we compare the social welfare of the foreign country under free trade with that under
tariﬀ policy. We compare SW F
f with SW T












®2 (144 ¡ 105¯2° ¡ 18¯4°2 ¡ ¯6°3)
18(9 + ¯2°)
2 : (13)






















f ¸ SW T
f if ¯ 2 (0;Ã] and SW F
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We compare SW F
f with SW T






®2 (3 ¡ ¯2°)(48 + 37¯2° + ¯4°2)
18(9 + ¯2°)
2 : (14)
9Solving (3 ¡ ¯2°) = 0 with respect to ¯ we obtain ¯ =
p
3=°. Therefore, SW F
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Next, we compare the social welfare of the foreign country under free trade with that
under tariﬀ policy. We compare SW F
l with SW T













®2 (81 + 27¯2° + 15¯4°2 + ¯6°3)
18(9 + ¯2°)
2 < 0: (15)
We compare SW F
l with SW T
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